W hen we see a group of individuals wearing kippot (skullcaps) or a male couple kissing each other, we readily categorize them as Jews or homosexuals, respectively (Kurzban et al, 2001; Taylor et al, 1978) . Like general categorization, social categorization helps us reduce the complexity of the environment, spares us the need to work out what to expect from each exemplar, and enables us to generate predictions about social groups (Allport, 1954; Medin and Smith, 1984; Tajfel, 1981) . Social categorization also shapes stereotypes, which represent semantic knowledge about a group, and prejudice, defined as evaluative reactions toward a given group (Carnaghi and Maass, 2007; Yzerbyt, 2006, 2007; Wittenbrink et al, 1997) . In this paper we refer to stereotypes as the semantic knowledge about social groups, and to prejudice as the evaluation, or appraisal, of these groups.
Neuropsychological observations have helped clarify how stereotypes and prejudice may be represented in the brain. Our 2014 study (Rumiati et al, 2014) used double dissociation logic (Shallice, 1988) to show that, in a sample of patients with frontotemporal dementia or dementia of the Alzheimer type, knowledge about social groups was represented independent of knowledge about either living things (eg, horses) or non-living things (inanimate objects, eg, keys). Moreover, Zahn et al (2009) showed that, compared to patients with corticobasal syndrome, patients with frontotemporal lobe degeneration had a selective semantic impairment in processing social concepts, defined as attributes of individuals' and group members' social behaviors.
In addition to damaged social concepts, patients with frontotemporal lobe degeneration displayed behavioral symptoms, such as disinhibition and emotional withdrawal (Snowden et al, 2001; Zahn et al, 2009 ). This co-occurrence of symptoms suggests that when such knowledge becomes inaccessible or degraded, social appraisal (ie, the way people construe the social context) is also likely to have deteriorated. By extension, we hypothesized that when knowledge about groups is impaired, a deterioration in social appraisal is also to be expected.
In the present study, we addressed a specific facet of social appraisal by assessing patients with dementia for a possible association between impaired social knowledge and prejudice. In our 2014 study (Rumiati et al, 2014) , we demonstrated that some of these patients have selectively damaged representations of social groups. This degradation of social-group knowledge would impede patients from expressing a systematic evaluation of the affected social-group concepts. Hence, no association would be expected between the patients' social-knowledge impairment about social groups and the patients' evaluative reactions toward those groups.
However, our 2014 study (Rumiati et al, 2014 ) led us to formulate a different prediction. In that investigation, we assessed patients' level of deficit with a task that tapped their knowledge about the superordinate (next higher) level of categories. Specifically, we asked patients to sort names of social groups, such as policemen, and names of nonliving things such as shoes (or living things such as roses), into the corresponding categories of social groups and nonliving things (or living entities).
According to prominent models of semantic memory (Patterson et al, 2007) , categorizing the name Mafiosi as a social group (as happens in our sorting tasks) does not necessarily require individuals to activate the representation of that social group. It is more likely that to perform this task, individuals need to activate the superordinate level "social groups" that applies to many social groups, not exclusively to Mafiosi. In the same way, sorting apples or hammers requires access to the superordinate level of the living or non-living category, respectively.
For this reason, little information about the distortion of the item-specific representation can be derived from this task. The possibility remains open that patients with dementia retain some conceptual knowledge about social groups that differentiates item-specific representations and serves as the basis for the social-group evaluation. This claim is further supported by neuropsychological evidence suggesting that the deficit at the superordinate semantic (category) level would not necessarily imply a deficit at the subordinate semantic (item-specific) level, and vice versa (Crutch and Warrington, 2008) . Hence, we suggest that patients (Rumiati et al, 2014 ) may be able to express an evaluation of specific social groups despite a deficit in superordinate knowledge about these groups. Two alternative hypotheses can be put forward on the type of association between deficit in social knowledge and prejudice.
The first hypothesis is that patients who misclassify social groups as non-human living things or as non-living things show stronger bias in evaluating those social groups than do people who classify social groups correctly. Studies of social cognition have reported that the prejudice reaction is stronger toward groups that are appraised as animal-or object-like (Harris and Fiske, 2006; Leyens et al, 2007) . Indeed, when participants assign a social group to a nonhuman superordinate category, they are less likely to control their prejudice reactions toward that group, and they tend to evaluate the group with greater emotional intensity (Eyssel and Ribas, 2012; Harris and Fiske, 2006 ). This hypothesis is further supported by 2 findings.
(1) In patients with dementia, a diminished ability to categorize social concepts correlated with disinhibiting behaviors (Mega et al, 1996; Zahn et al, 2009 ). (2) In healthy participants, a reduction in self-regulating processes weakened individuals' control over their prejudice reactions (Amodio et al, 2006 (Amodio et al, , 2008 . Therefore, participants with a semantic deficit for social groups might evaluate social groups with greater-than-normal emotional intensity, feeling more negative about social groups that healthy controls have rated as extremely negative, and more positive about social groups that controls have rated as extremely positive.
The second, opposing hypothesis is that patients' semantic deficit for social groups may be expected to be associated with a lower-than-normal evaluative response bias. The misclassification of social groups as living or non-living things might signal uncertainty in the appraisal of the social groups, triggering a less evaluative reaction toward the incorrectly classified groups than controls would give.
This second hypothesis is in line with previous evidence attesting to an association between a semantic deficit for social concepts and high levels of emotional withdrawal (Zahn et al, 2009 ). There is also evidence of a pervasive emotional blunting in patients with frontotemporal dementia or semantic dementia (Snowden et al, 2001) , as well as evidence of a high prevalence of apathy in patients with frontotemporal dementia and, though to a lesser extent, in those with dementia of the Alzheimer type (Chow et al, 2009; Mega et al, 1996) . Thus, we hypothesized that the emotional intensity of evaluations of social groups would decrease in patients with impaired knowledge about social groups. In other words, the patients would evaluate negative groups less negatively, and positive groups less positively.
Our current study aimed at testing these 2 alternative hypotheses. To date, neuropsychological studies with brain-damaged patients have looked separately at their stereotypes (Gozzi et al, 2009; Milne and Grafman, 2001) and their prejudice reactions (Ciaramelli et al, 2012; Phelps et al, 2003) . Here we assessed both the representation and the evaluation of social groups within the same study, and we tested whether the stereotypes and prejudice reactions are commonly associated.
METHODS
We collected the data for this study at the same time as the data reported in Rumiati et al (2014) . This study represents further analysis of the data set.
Participants
We used the same participants as in Rumiati et al (2014) : 21 patients with probable frontotemporal dementia or dementia of the Alzheimer type, and 23 controls. The patients had been referred consecutively to the Agostino Gemelli Hospital Polyclinic in Rome, Italy, because of concerns about their memory and linguistic abilities. The patients had a mean age of 76.62, with a range of 63 to 100. Their diagnosis was presumptive, based on clinical evaluation and a thorough neuropsychological assessment (Table 1) . Computed tomograms or magnetic resonance scans were available for all of the patients. For more information about their neuropsychological assessment and demographic and other clinical information, see Rumiati et al (2014) , tables 5-7.
The controls were selected relatives and caregivers of the patients. Volunteers qualified for the study if they did not have a history of a neurologic or psychiatric disorder. We matched the controls for age and education with the patients.
All of the participants were native speakers of the Italian language and had normal vision, hearing, and reading and writing ability. Independent testing ensured that the patients could understand the tasks' instructions.
The Ethics Committee of the Agostino Gemelli Hospital Polyclinic approved our study protocol. All participants or their caregivers signed an informed consent document before starting testing.
Procedures
We conducted the entire study in the Italian language. Participants performed 2 tasks: a semantic sorting task, whose results were reported in Rumiati et al (2014) , and an evaluative task. We describe both tasks here.
Semantic Sorting Task
We gave the semantic sorting task over 3 sessions, held about a week apart, at the Polyclinic. Each session was devoted to 1 sorting assignment:
Sorting 1 = non-living thing versus living thing Sorting 2 = social group versus non-living thing Sorting 3 = social group versus living thing During each sorting, we gave participants 40 different cards-20 belonging to each of the 2 categories being tested in that sorting. On each card was printed a plural noun from 1 of the 2 categories. We gave the participants 1 card at a time. We also gave them a label naming each category. We asked them to speak the word that was printed on the card and then put the card next to its category label.
For example, as part of Sorting 1, we gave participants a card for forks. We asked them to say the word and then put the card next to either the "non-living thing" label or the "living thing" label. They could thus categorize the Rumiati et al (2014) , tables 5-7. 1 Grigoletto et al, 1999. 2 Carlesimo et al, 1996. 3 Caffarra et al, 2002. 4 Orsini et al, 1987 . 5 De Renzi et al, 1968 . 6 De Renzi et al, 1966 . 7 Miceli et al, 1994 . MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination. = performance below the pathologic threshold. = performance at or above the pathologic threshold. NA = not administered.
card correctly as a non-living thing or erroneously as a living thing. For the cats card in Sorting 1, they could categorize correctly as a living thing or erroneously as a non-living thing. In Sorting 2, the category labels were social groups and non-living things.
In Sorting 3, when the categories were social groups and living things, we explained to the participants that social groups were groups of human beings, and the living things category did not include human beings. Thus, if a noun described human members of a social group, it should go in the social group category.
Our stimuli were 20 plural nouns in each category. These examples show the noun in the original Italian, followed by an English translation (Rumiati et al, 2014) :
Living things: cipolle (onions), scimmie (monkeys), pomodori (tomatoes), farfalle (butterflies), elefanti (elephants) Non-living things: letti (beds), finestre (windows), cappelli (hats), tavoli (tables), piatti (dishes) Social groups: Immigrati (immigrants), Imprenditori (businessmen), Vecchi (elderly people), Poveri (poor people), Laureati (graduates)
Across the categories, we chose nouns that shared a similar average number of letters and similar average written frequency.
As outlined in Rumiati et al (2014) , we developed our list of 20 social groups using the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al, 2002; Harris and Fiske, 2007;  for a cross-cultural study, see Cuddy et al, 2009 ). This model posits that people judge social groups by the balance between the members' presumed competence and warmth. Based on previous international and national works on this model, we chose a mix of social groups that have been stereotyped as competent but cold (eg, Jews), low in competence but warm (eg, housewives), both competent and warm (eg, Christians), and both incompetent and cold (eg, drug addicts). We tested our chosen nouns to ensure that participants could distinguish the social groups from social concepts such as moodiness and humility. Results of the sorting task showed that the patients were less accurate than the controls at all 3 sortings: discriminating living from non-living things, social groups from non-living things, and social groups from living things (Rumiati et al, 2014) . Moreover, findings derived on double dissociation logic indicated that the patients' knowledge about social groups was represented independent of their knowledge about either living or non-living things.
Semantic Evaluative Task
Immediately after participants completed the Sorting 3 assignment, they took the evaluative task. We told them that they were about to read a list of groups of individuals, and we were interested in their opinion about each group. We told them that they could express their opinion about each group by choosing a value on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive), with 4 indicating a neutral attitude (for a similar measure, see Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986 ). Then we gave the participants the full list of social groups on a piece of paper. For each group, they were to mark their chosen rating with a pencil.
Control Participants' Rankings of Social Groups
We used 2 strategies to rank the 20 social groups from the most negative to the most positive. First, we ranked the ratings from the control group in our 2014 study. From most negative to most positive, the rankings were: Criminali (criminals), Mafiosi (Mafiosi), Drogati (drug addicts), Zingari (gypsies), Immigrati (immigrants), Poveri (poor people), Neri (Black people), Meridionali (Italian Southerners), Ebrei (Jews), Ciechi (blind people), Disabili (disabled people), Ricchi (rich people), Settentrionali (Italian Northerners), Vecchi (elderly people), Imprenditori (businessmen), Poliziotti (policemen), Casalinghe (housewives), Cristiani (Christians), Laureati (graduates), and Padri (fathers) (Figure 1) .
Second, to control for a possibly idiosyncratic ranking of these social groups by the original control group, we asked a second independent group of 20 healthy individuals to perform the same evaluation. Our analyses revealed a strongly significant correlation between the 2 control groups' evaluations (r = 0.82, P = 0.0001) as well as between their social-group rankings (Spearman rho = 0.93, P = 0.001), thus corroborating a high level of consensus about the rankings.
Finally, based on the controls' ratings, we clustered the social groups in 4 ordinal categories:
Extremely negative (scale value <3): criminals, Mafiosi, drug addicts, gypsies; 1-sample t test, t > 3.87, P < 0.001 Neutral (scale value = 4, the scale midpoint): immigrants, poor people, Blacks, Southerners; 1-sample t test, t < 1.78, P > 0.09 Slightly positive (scale value = 5): Jews, blind people, disabled people, rich people, Northerners, elderly people, businessmen; 1-sample t test, t < 1.85, P > 0.08 Extremely positive (scale value >5): policemen, housewives, Christians, graduates, fathers; 1-sample t test, t > 3.54, P < 0.002 Rumiati et al's (2014) tables 3 and 4 present our patients' performance in sorting social groups versus nonliving things (Sorting 2) and social groups versus living things (Sorting 3). Patients' standardized-correct responses (ie, we standardized patients' responses on controls' responses) to categorizing social groups in Sortings 2 and 3 correlated positively and significantly. We averaged patients' standardized-correct responses to categorizing social groups in Sortings 2 and 3 to form an overall index. We found that the more negative the patients' values on the standardized-correct responses to social items, the more severe the patients' impairment in sorting these items. For the current analyses, we further used the patients' standardized-correct responses for non-living (Sorting 2) and living (Sorting 3) items.
Based on Rumiati et al's (2014) tables 3 and 4, we combined the 11 patients who, according to the Crawford and Howell test (Crawford and Howell, 1998) , showed a statistically significant deficit in categorizing the social groups on either Sorting 2 or 3 (Patients 2 to 6, 8, 13, 15, 20, 21) . We also combined the 10 patients who did not show this deficit. We found that the patients with a socialgroup deficit (mean [M] = À 5.86, standard error [SE] = 1.26) gave lower standardized-correct responses to social groups than did the patients without a social-group deficit Evaluative ratings of 20 social groups by 11 patients with dementia and a deficit in semantic social-group knowledge, 10 patients with dementia but intact semantic social-group knowledge, and 23 controls. The 7-point rating scale ranges from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive), with 4 indicating a neutral attitude. The social groups on the X-axis are listed in the rankings given to them by controls, with the most negatively rated groups on the left and the most positively rated on the right.
(M = À 0.23, SE = 0.13, t 19 = 4.68, P = 0.001), thus confirming the precision of this split.
Statistical Analysis
In our first statistical analysis, we used the standardized-correct responses to social items in a linear regression model as the predictor, and participants' evaluations of the social groups as the outcome variable. We analyzed the data separately for the extremely negative group cluster, the neutral cluster, the slightly positive cluster, and the extremely positive cluster. Linear regression analysis is the most appropriate statistical approach because it treats the level of deficit in sorting social items as a continuous variable. Moreover, this approach allowed us to determine whether and how increasing (versus decreasing) deficits in sorting social groups could predict participants' evaluations of the 4 clusters of ranked groups.
In the second analysis, we treated the deficit in sorting social items as a categorical variable and, using analyses of variance, we compared the evaluations of social groups made by patients with and without a socialgroup deficit to the evaluations made by the controls.
Finally, we compared the results of these 2 statistical procedures.
RESULTS

Levels of Deficit in Social-Group Sorting and Social-Group Evaluation
Patients' averaged correct responses to social groups were z-transformed (range: À 2.5 to 0.8). We applied the same transformation to the averaged social-group evaluations, separately for patients (range: À 2.1 to 1.6) and controls (range: À 2.2 to 1.9). None of the z-transformed scores fell outside ± 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of each variable. In other words, we did not find any outliers on these variables. We then performed the following analyses on the full sample of participants.
We performed regression analyses first on the averaged evaluations of social groups (ie, outcome variables) on the averaged standardized-correct responses to social groups (F 1,16 = 5.35, P = 0.03, R 2 adjusted = 0.20). In a second step, we performed regressions on the patients' standardized-correct responses to non-living and living things (F 3,14 = 1.83, P = 0.19, R 2 adjusted = 0.13). The second step did not explain a higher level of variance than the first step (F change = 0.30, P = 0.74).
The averaged standardized-correct responses to social groups were significantly associated with the outcome variable (B = 0.11, SE = 0.05, t = 2.31, P = 0.034) in the first step. This association remained significant (B = 0.11, SE = 0.05, t = 2.20, P = 0.045) after we controlled for patients' standardized-correct responses to both non-living (B = À 0.002, SE = 0.007, t = 0.26, P = 0.80) and living items (B = 0.007, SE = 0.010, t = 0.77, P = 0.45) in the second step.
To test the 2 alternative hypotheses, we performed the same analyses on participants' evaluative ratings of each of the social-group clusters: extremely negative, neutral, slightly positive, and extremely positive. In all of these models, the second step did not explain a higher level of variance than the first step (D < 0.08, F change < 1.1, P > 0.36). The more severe the patients' deficits were in sorting social groups, the less negatively the patients rated the extremely negative cluster (B = À 0.2, SE = 0.09, t = 2.19, P = 0.044). We found no significant association between patients' deficit and their evaluation of the neutral cluster (B = 0.06, SE = 0.07, t = 0.84, P = 0.415). The more severe the patients' deficit, the less positively they evaluated the slightly positive cluster (B = 0.19, SE = 0.06, t = 3.28, P = 0.005) and the extremely positive cluster (B = 0.28, SE = 0.07, t = 3.94, P = 0.001).
Social-Group Evaluations by Patients with (and Without) a Deficit in Sorting Social Groups Versus Evaluations by Controls
We used analysis of variance to analyze the evaluative ratings: 3 (participant groups: patients with socialgroup deficit versus patients without social-group deficit versus controls) Â 20 (valence of social-group ranking), with the former as a between-participants factor and the latter as a within-participants factor.
The main effect of the participant groups was not significant (F 2,41 = 0.87, P = 0.43, Z 2 p = 0.04), indicating no difference in the overall evaluative ratings among participants. The main effect of the valence of social-group ranking was significant (F 19,23 = 14.04, P = 0.0001, Z 2 p = 0.92). The evaluation of the social groups increased linearly from the more negatively to the more positively evaluated groups, as indicated by the analyses of the linear trend (F 1,41 = 178.26, P = 0.0001, Z 2 p = 0.81). More important for our purpose, the interaction between participants and valence of social-group ranking was significant (F 38,48 = 2.51, P = 0.001, Z 2 p = 0.67) (Figure 1 ). The analyses of the linear trend were significant in all 3 participant groups: the patients with a social-group deficit (F 1,9 = 7.4, P < 0.024, Z 2 p = 0.45); patients without a social-group deficit (F 1,10 = 43.91, P < 0.001, Z 2 p = 0.81); and controls (F 1,22 = 552.66, P < 0.001, Z 2 p = 0.96). These findings indicated that, though to a different extent from the patients without a social-group deficit and from the controls, the patients with a socialgroup deficit were still sensitive to, and responded in accordance with, the valence of social-group ranking, ie, from the more negatively evaluated clusters to the more positively evaluated clusters.
To gain a better understanding of this interaction, we performed pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni correction: alpha 0.05/12 = 0.004) on the 4 clusters. For the extremely negative cluster (F 2,41 = 11.134, P = 0.001, Z 2 p = 0.35), patients with a social-group deficit (M = 3.3, SE = 0.32) reported a less negative evaluation than did the controls (M = 1.48, SE = 0.21, P = 0.0001); the patients without a social-group deficit (M = 2.14, SE = 0.31) and the controls evaluated this cluster similarly (P = 0.09). No difference emerged between the patients with a social-group deficit and the controls (P > 0.19), or between the patients without a social-group deficit and the controls (P > 0.71), in the evaluation of the neutral (F 2,41 = 0.8, P = 0.46, Z 2 p = 0.04) and slightly positive clusters (F 2,41 = 1.24, P = 0.3, Z 2 p = 0.06). The patients with a social-group deficit (M = 5.04, SE = 0.27) reported less positive evaluations of the extremely positive clusters than did the controls (M = 6.24, SE = 0.18, P = 0.001); the patients without a social-group deficit (M = 6.22, SE = 0.26) and the controls were alike in their evaluations of the extremely positive cluster (P = 0.94, F 2,41 = 7.42, P = 0.002, Z 2 p = 0.27). Only for patients with a social-group deficit did pairwise comparisons among the 4 clusters (F 3,39 = 26.77, P = 0.001, Z 2 p = 0.67) reveal similar ratings for the extremely negative and neutral clusters (P = 0.39). This result suggested that the patients perceived the extremely negative cluster as being neutral. They also evaluated the extremely positive cluster and the slightly positive cluster alike (P = 0.15), indicating a less positive evaluation of the extremely positive cluster. These patients gave significantly different evaluations to the neutral cluster and the slightly positive cluster (P = 0.001), suggesting that the patients saw the slightly positive cluster as being considerably more positive than the neutral cluster.
Neuropsychological Assessment and Evaluative Reactions
We turned next to the patients' performance on 3 neuropsychological tests, reported in Rumiati et al's (2014) tables 5-7: the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Grigoletto et al, 1999) , naming pictures (Miceli et al, 1994) , and Raven Matrices (Carlesimo et al, 1996) . We correlated the patients' performance on these tests with their averaged evaluative reactions to each of the 4 clusters.
The patients' score on the MMSE correlated negatively with their evaluation of the extremely negative cluster (r = À 0.55, P = 0.009), and correlated positively with their evaluation of the extremely positive cluster (r = 0.53, P = 0.014). The patients' averaged score on naming pictures did not correlate with their evaluation of the extremely negative cluster (r = À 0.29, P = 0.20), but did correlate positively and significantly with their evaluation of the extremely positive cluster (r = 0.57, P = 0.006). The patients' score on the Raven Matrices did not correlate with their evaluations of any of the clusters (P > 0.13).
DISCUSSION
Previous findings had suggested that social groups might well be represented in the brain independent of non-social concepts such as living and non-living things (Contreras et al, 2012; Rumiati et al, 2014; Zahn et al, 2009) . However, concepts about social groups might enjoy a special status, as they are tightly interwoven with the way we evaluate them.
In this study, we aimed at assessing precisely this issue by analyzing whether deficits affecting patients' semantic knowledge about social groups were associated with the patients' evaluative reactions toward those groups. We expected that, compared to controls, patients who exhibited a more severe impairment in sorting social groups would show either a greater or lesser prejudice toward the groups. We tackled the issue by exploiting 2 different statistical approaches, ie, treating the deficit in sorting social groups as either a continuous variable or a categorical variable. Combined, these approaches proved an association between deficits affecting patients' semantic knowledge about social groups and the patients' evaluative reactions toward those groups.
First, the regression analyses showed that the patients' emotional intensity in evaluating social groups lessened as their impairment in sorting social groups worsened, independent of the severity of their deficit in sorting living and non-living things. We confirmed this association for the slightly and the extremely positive clusters of social groups. The severity of the patients' deficit related inversely to their evaluation of the extremely negative cluster of social groups: The patients with more severe deficits in sorting social groups evaluated the extremely negative cluster less negatively than did the controls.
Our second statistical approach revealed that the controls and the patients who did not have a deficit in sorting social groups gave similar evaluations to the social-group clusters. In sharp contrast, the patients who had a deficit in sorting social groups rated the extremely negative cluster less negatively and the extremely positive cluster less positively than did the controls. Specifically, the patients with a selective deficit considered the extremely negative cluster the same as the neutral cluster, and the extremely positive cluster the same as the slightly positive cluster. These patients evaluated both the extremely and slightly positive clusters more positively than they did the extremely negative and neutral clusters.
These findings are in line with the linear trend analyses showing that the patients with a social-group deficit were still able to differentiate the evaluation of groups as a function of the valence of social-group ranking (ie, from the more negatively evaluated groups to the more positively evaluated groups), although the patients evaluated the groups less intensively than did the controls and the patients who had intact social-group knowledge.
Our findings from the regression analyses ruled out our hypothesis that patients' ability to evaluate social groups was associated with a general semantic impairment that also involved non-social knowledge, ie, knowledge of living and non-living things. To the contrary, we failed to find an association between patients' accuracy in sorting non-living and living things and their evaluation of social groups, thus suggesting that the patients' ability to evaluate social groups did not result from a general semantic impairment in classifying items.
Further, we found that the association between the patients' level of impairment in sorting social groups and their prejudice reactions was still significant even after we controlled for the patients' impairment in sorting living and non-living things.
Finally, the patients' neuropsychological test scores indicated that the severity of their generalized cognitive deterioration, as measured by the MMSE, and, at least in part, the severity of their linguistic deficits, predicted the deterioration in their evaluative reactions. Indeed, the more severe the patients' general mental deterioration according to the MMSE, the more positive their evaluation of the extremely negative cluster and the more negative their evaluation of the extremely positive cluster.
In Rumiati et al (2014) , we reported that patients' MMSE score was not related to the severity of their deficit in sorting social groups. Hence, the patients' level of deficit in sorting social groups and the severity of their general mental deterioration might constitute 2 distinct factors that independently contributed to the patients' abnormal evaluation of social groups.
Our findings are also in line with neuroimaging studies showing a possible interplay between semantic knowledge about groups and prejudice. Brain regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex and temporal lobe have been associated with stereotype-based judgments (Contreras et al, 2012; Gilbert et al, 2012; Knutson et al, 2007; Quadflieg et al, 2009; Saxe and Wexler, 2005) . Although prejudice reactions are mainly rooted in the affective processing associated with the amygdala (Cunningham et al, 2004; Lieberman et al, 2005; Phelps et al, 2000) , the medial prefrontal cortex and temporal lobe are also recruited, at least in part, when individuals process evaluative aspects of social groups (Cunningham et al, , 2004 Harris and Fiske, 2006; Wheeler and Fiske, 2005) .
Notwithstanding the importance of these findings for the understanding of the relationship between knowledge about and evaluations of social groups, our study leaves unanswered some important questions on the link between stereotypes and prejudice, at least in patients with dementia. For example, a direct measure of emotional withdrawal (Rankin et al, 2006) would help us to clarify the mediational role of this variable in the relationship between social-group deficit and social-group evaluations.
In the present study, we assessed patients' knowledge about social groups through a sorting task that required participants to classify groups using a superordinate categorization. In classifying the social groups, the patients might have relied on relatively general conceptual-semantic knowledge (Patterson et al, 2007) . Research on the conceptual knowledge of patients with semantic dementia has revealed that when they are presented with a picture of a particular bird, they can produce the word animal without being able to say robin or even bird (Patterson et al, 2007) .
Future research should address the relationship between participants' evaluations of social groups and their conceptual-semantic knowledge using a more specific level of item classification (eg, are they Italians or Germans?) rather than our more general level (eg, are they a social group or a group of non-living things?). In so doing, we would directly assess patients' conceptual knowledge independent of their associative-semantic knowledge, which is more likely to be involved when they are required to use superordinate categorization of stimuli. Moreover, assessing both patients' social-group conceptual knowledge and evaluation would allow us to address the issue of whether degraded social-group representations are necessarily associated with an impairment in evaluating the corresponding social groups, using double dissociation logic.
Our results also showed that patients with a deficit in social-group knowledge had a reduced intensity of the social-group evaluations. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that these patients have a reduced general intensity in their evaluative reactions that extends beyond social groups to include living and non-living things. More research is needed to clarify whether these patients' reduced prejudice response is strictly connected to a semantic deficit of social knowledge or is associated with a more general decrease in their emotional appraisal.
